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We examine the effect of patenting on the survival prospects of 356 internet-related firms that IPO'd
at the height of the stock market bubble of the late 1990s. By March 2005, nearly 2/3 of these firms
had delisted from the NASDAQ exchange. Although changes in the legal environment in the US in
the 1990s made it much easier to obtain patents on software and, ultimately, on business methods,
less than half of the firms in this sample obtained, or attempted to obtain, patents. For those that did,
we hypothesize that patents conferred competitive advantages that translate into higher probability
of survival, though they may also simply be a signal of firm quality. Controlling for age, venture-capital
backing, financial characteristics, and stock market conditions, patenting is positively associated with
survival. Quite different processes appear to govern exit via acquisition compared to exit via delisting
from the exchange due to business failure. Firms that applied for more patents were less likely to be
acquired, though obtaining unusually highly cited patents may make them more attractive acquisition
















Invention, entrepreneurship, and entry are very signi¯cant factors driving growth and compe-
tition. Patents are tightly linked to these fundamental economic processes, providing signals
of quality to investors, some measure of protection from rapid imitation, and a basis for many
types of commercial transactions in the market for knowledge (see Arora et al. (2001), Gans
et al. (2002), or Scotchmer (2005)). This paper explores the role played by patents in shaping
industry dynamics and ¯rm survival during the rapid and unconstrained real time experiment
provided by the dot-com boom of the late 1990s. During these \bubble years" new ¯rms had
unusually easy access to capital to fund their exploration of commercial opportunities opened
up by the explosive growth of the internet. Entrepreneurs rapidly devised and implemented
new business models and developed new products, with new ¯rms appearing apparently from
nowhere to become household names in ¯nancial services, retailing, and many other sec-
tors. Unfortunately, it equally quickly became clear that many of these new businesses were
intrinsically unpro¯table and the boom years of unrestricted entry, easy access to capital,
and extraordinary valuations of untested new companies were quickly followed by an equally
dramatic period of collapsing stock prices, exit and bankruptcies.
This remarkable episode took place against a backdrop of a worldwide surge in ¯ling
and granting of patents, and the extension of the patent system, particularly in the United
States, into new subject matter areas such as software and business methods. Patentability
of software per se was ¯rmly established in the US by the mid-1990s, and decisions in the
US courts in the late 1990s such as AT&T v. Excel Communications and State Street v.
Signature Financial Services were widely interpreted as opening the door to a °ood of patents
on methods of doing business, particularly those implemented in computers and networks.
The new dot-com companies therefore had the option of seeking patent protection for
their products and business processes | and many inventors and entrepreneurs apparently
took advantage of this opportunity, with thousands of \business method" patent applications
¯led with the USPTO between 1999 and 2002. These patents generated considerable con-
troversy, with many industry participants, legal scholars, and economists concerned about
the potential adverse consequences of allowing large numbers of low-quality patents to issue
(Hall (2003), Merges (1999), Meurer (2003), Cockburn (2001), Hunt (2001) and many oth-
ers). Many of these concerns parallel those expressed about the consequences of software
patents for innovation and competition. Critics argued that the °ood of business method
patents would \choke" innovation by blocking new technological developments, making it
prohibitively expensive for new ¯rms to enter these markets, or allowing patentees to con-
trol entire markets by obtaining patents with inappropriately broad claims, and/or trivial
inventive steps over the existing technology. Apparently concerned about the opportunistic
assertion of patents on business methods against incumbent ¯rms, the US Congress took
the unusual step of singling out business methods for special treatment, creating a limited
\earlier inventor" defense against patent infringement (or prior user right) for \a method of
2doing or conducting business".1 However the impact of these patents on the pro¯tability and
growth of the companies that obtained them, or on the pace of innovation in the industries
in which they compete is far from clear.
Quantitative research on patents for software and business methods is limited and often
contradictory. Lerner (2002) found no clear evidence on the impact of patents on innova-
tion in ¯nance. Lerner & Zhu (2005) found, if anything, a positive impact of strengthened
patent protection on software ¯rms. On the other hand, Bessen & Hunt (2004) suggest that
increasing numbers of software patents are associated with a decrease in R&D by large soft-
ware companies. Gambardella & Giarratana (2006) ¯nd an important role for patents in the
security software industry, where the commercial success of small ¯rms appears to have been
driven by their ability to license technology to established downstream competitors. Noel
& Schankermann (2006) ¯nd evidence for a negative impact of strategic patenting on entry,
R&D, and market value of software ¯rms, while Cockburn & MacGarvie (2006) ¯nd that
while incumbent patents deter entry in software markets, higher numbers of patents held by
entrants stimulate entry. Hall & MacGarvie (2006) ¯nd mixed e®ects of changes in legal doc-
trine on the market value and stock returns of software ¯rms, with a initially negative impact
of the strengthening software patent protection on the valuation of incumbent software ¯rms
followed by an increase in the market valuation of software patents after 1995. There is,
therefore, considerable uncertainty about the economic value and impact of these patents.2
Rather than attempt to directly assess the monetary value of these patents, or relate
them to technological indicators of the pace of innovation, this paper examines the impact
of patenting on a much more basic measure of economic impact | the survival of a sample
of internet-based and software ¯rms that went public during the boom phase of the dot-com
bubble, and then faced high probabilities of business failure during the bust period that
followed. To the extent that patents obtained by these ¯rms improved their competitive
position, through mechanisms such as excluding competitors, supporting higher margins,
raising rivals' costs, or signaling quality, we hypothesize that they should have conferred a
substantial survival advantage. Estimates of the size and signi¯cance of such an e®ect may
provide useful insight into the economic impact of these types of patents.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 of the paper we brie°y
summarize previous ¯ndings on ¯rm turn-over and review existing literature scrutinizing
software and business method patents. Section 3 contains a short description of the dataset
used for the analysis, which combines ¯nancial data and patent data for 356 ¯rms that made
an IPO on the NASDAQ at the height of the stock market bubble between 1998 and 2001.
In Section 4, results are presented from estimating multivariate hazard models relating ¯rm
survival to patenting, ¯nancing, and economic performance. Finally, Section 5 concludes and
o®ers some implications of our ¯ndings.
135 USC Sec. 273.
2It is even unclear whether claims about the poor quality of business method patents are
generally true. Hunter (2003) and Allison & Tiller (2003) argue that business method patents
compare well to patents in other technologies in terms of citation of prior art, etc.
32 Patents and the Turn-over of Internet Firms
In 1998 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit removed the last obstacles to obtaining
patents on business methods per se in the United States with its famous State Street Bank
and Trust Co. vs Signature Financial Group decision involving US patent No. 5,193,056 in
1998 (Hunt 2001, Conley 2003).3 As a consequence large numbers of applications for business
method patents were ¯led in the USPTO, and many of the patents that subsequently issued
protect inventions closely related to internet business models and software used in various
e-business applications. The rapid increase in application and grant ¯gures as well as some
widely publicized patent infringement cases initiated a broad debate on the legal and economic
consequences of allowing these patents.4 Concerns expressed by many scholars about the
potentially low quality of granted business method and software patents as a consequence
of inadequate examination procedures of the USPTO by numerous authors (Dreyfuss 2000,
Hunt 2001, Merges 1999, Wagner forthcoming 2007) were accompanied by strong objections
and criticism from practitioners and policymakers. In response to this, the USPTO moved
to tighten the examination procedures and standards for patents ¯led in USPTO Class 705,
the principal classi¯cation for business method patents (USPTO 1999).5
Despite the debate on the consequences of granting large numbers of poor quality business
method and software patents, their impact on economic outcomes | such as incentives to
innovate and the pace of technical change | in a®ected industries has received little attention.
These outcomes are very di±cult to measure directly, but some insight into the economic
signi¯cance of these patents may be gained from looking at whether or not they haev an
impact on the economic performance of ¯rms that obtain them.
Much of the literature on the value of patents has focused on indirect measures of their
impact on pro¯tability, such as stock market value of the ¯rm. Relatively little systematic
3\As an alternative ground for invalidating the '056 patent under Section 101, the [district]
court relied on the judicially-created, so-called "business method" exception to statutory
subject matter. We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest." State
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. 149 F.3d 1368. (Fed. Cir.
1998).
4Outcomes of these cases have been mixed. In the Priceline.com vs. Microsoft/Expedia
case, Priceline.com obtained an undisclosed settlement payment from Microsoft leading to
a 30% increase in its stock market capitalization. But in another widely followed dispute,
Amazon.com attempted to enforce a patent on \one-click" on-line purchasing against Bar-
nesandnoble.com with only limited success: though Amazon.com succeeded in obtaining a
preliminary injunction enjoining Barnesandnoble.com from using the Express Lane feature
on its website during the busy Christmas buying season, this was quite quickly vacated on
appeal in the face of persuasive evidence questioning the validity of Amazon.com's patent.
Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, et al. Civ. Act. No. 00-1109, 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed.
Cir., February 14, 2001).
5While tighter scrutiny of applications through \second pair of eyes" procedures, recruit-
ment of appropriately quali¯ed examiners, and improved access to relevant prior art may
have raised the quality of granted patents in this class, it is not clear whether the rate at
which business method patents are being issued has fallen. Applicants are likely to have
reacted to this tightened scrutiny of applications in class 705 by framing the content of the
application in a way that increases the likelihood of it being directed to a di®erent part of
the Patent O±ce.
4evidence has been gathered on relationships between patenting and more basic indicators of
¯rm performance such as growth and survival. These may be particularly useful for small or
new ¯rms, where the signal conveyed by market valuation of intangibles may be particularly
di±cult to identify against the noise generated by high levels of uncertainty about future
growth prospects, thin trading and very volatile asset prices.
One notable exception can be found in recent paper by Mann & Sager (2005). Here
the authors combine data on the venture capital ¯nancing of software start-ups with data
on the patents held by those ¯rms in order to analyze the relation between patenting and
their ability to obtain venture ¯nancing, as well as and their progress through the venture
cycle. They ¯nd some correlation between patenting and di®erent proxies for success but also
acknowledge that the private value of holding software patents varies greatly between ¯rms
even within the same industrial subsegment.6
Here we tackle a similar question | is there a private bene¯t from patenting business
methods and software? | with a somewhat di®erent research strategy. Analyzing a set
of dot-com ¯rms pursuing business models closely tied to internet services and software, we
relate patent holdings to the survival of these ¯rms as publicly traded companies. The survival
analysis framework we employ for this purpose has been widely used in previous empirical
studies of ¯rm failure and industry dynamics. Compared to a relatively sparse theoretical
literature7, IO economics is rich in empirical evidence on entry and exit, and there is a well-
established set of `stylized facts' on ¯rm survival. Geroski (1995), Sutton (1997) and Caves
(1998) provide comprehensive surveys. Considering ¯rm characteristics, the most common
result is that survival is positively related to ¯rm size and to ¯rm age. Most studies ¯nd that
small ¯rms (who are more likely to operate below the minimum e±cient scale) exhibit higher
failure rates. Moreover, younger ¯rms have higher failure probabilities and Audretsch (1995)
argues that ¯rm age is a proxy for the accumulation of information about technology, markets
and a ¯rm's own cost function. A greater stock of accumulated information should lead to
higher survival chances. In addition to these ¯rm characteristics, industry characteristics and
the competitive environment have also been studied in depth. In particular, the point in the
technology or industry life cycle at which a ¯rm operates has been found to be an important
determinant of ¯rm survival (Agarwal & Gort 1996, 2002, Suarez & Utterback 1993, 1995).
Further, failure is positively related to overall rates of entry in an industry (Mata et al. 1995,
Honjo 2000) and also to average price-cost margins (Audretsch 1991, Audretsch & Mahmood
1995).
A di®erent strand of literature, predominantly from the ¯elds of accounting and ¯nance,
relates the occurrence of bankruptcy and M&A-activity to ¯nancial ratios based on capital
6In a comment on a closely related paper by Mann, Bessen (2005) points out that some of
these ¯ndings have to be interpreted with caution.
7Among the few theoretical treatments of ¯rm turn-over are Jovanovic (1982) and Hopen-
hayn (1992) who suggest that in a theory of learning and noisy selection, ¯rm age and size are
important determinants of survival. In a recent paper, Cooley & Quadrini (2001) introduce
¯nancial markets to this model and analyze the e®ect of market frictions on ¯rm survival.
5market data and accounting information derived from ¯rms' ¯nancial statements. In a com-
prehensive study, Fama & French (2004) document a strong increase in the number of new
lists at the NASDAQ in the period between 1973 and 2001 which is accompanied by a sharp
decline in survival rates over time. Fama & French (2004) ¯nd that surviving ¯rms exhibit
higher pro¯tability and growth rates. Logit models have been used in this context to predict
take-over targets (Palepu 1986) or to analyze delistings from stock markets (Seguin & Smoller
1997). Seguin & Smoller (1997) ¯nd a higher mortality rate for lower priced stocks than for
higher priced issues while mortality in their sample is not in°uenced by market capitalization.
Recently, Shumway (2001) emphasizes the advantages of hazard models compared to static
models in predicting bankruptcy using ¯nancial and accounting ratios. Applying this type
of model to bankruptcy data, Chava & Jarrow (2004) ¯nd that accounting variables add
little predictive power when market based measures are already included in the model while
Beaver et al. (2005) identify additional explanatory power of information based on ¯nancial
reporting.
A number of recent papers have focused on the cohort of young high-tech ¯rms that
went public during the stock market bubble of 1998-2001. These studies seek to characterize
both the extraordinary conditions of the equity markets at that time as well as the innovative
activities of the new ¯rms, relating these to ¯rm survival after the IPO. Audretsch & Lehmann
(2004), for example, analyze the survival times of a sample of 341 ¯rms from various industries
listed on the German Neuer Markt8 as a function of ¯rms' human capital and intellectual
property assets. Modelling the length of time a ¯rm was listed on the stock market before
it was delisted, the authors ¯nd that the likelihood of survival is positively related to ¯rm
size, the human capital accumulated in the board of directors, and the number of German
patents held by a ¯rm. Moreover, Audretsch & Lehmann (2004) ¯nd that failure rates are
negatively a®ected by the investment share of venture capital ¯rms prior to IPO. In a related
study, Jain & Kini (2000) ¯nd that the presence of venture capitalists prior to going public
improves the survival prospects of IPO ¯rms.
Other studies have focused on the survival of ¯rms that are based on a business model
that relies on the internet to perform transactions, distribute products or provide services,
and interact with customers. For instance, Kau®man & Wang (2003) analyzed survival times
of 103 such \internet ¯rms" listed on the NASDAQ.9 Employing a competing risks speci¯-
cation they found that ¯rms which distribute physical goods via the internet (as opposed to
¯rms provided digital services) and ¯rms which target both consumer and business markets
have longer survival times until either a merger or a delisting occurs. Botman et al. (2004)
analyzed survival of 326 internet ¯rms listed on the NASDAQ between 1996 and 2001, as a
8Neuer Markt was launched as market segment for high-tech and internet start-ups by
the German Stock Exchange on March, 10th, 1997. Six years later on June, 5th, 2003 Neuer
Markt was closed in a re-segmentation of the German Stock Exchange | most likely due to
dramatic losses in market capitalization and loss of investor interest.
9The authors are not completely clear on whether their sample consists exclusively of
NASDAQ-listed ¯rms, but given the US context this seems highly likely.
6function of variables intended to characterize market conditions at the time the IPO took
place, the reputation of the management and the investment bank leading the IPO as well
as ¯rm characteristics such as ¯nancial condition and age. Their results show that surviving
¯rms are associated with lower risk indications in the IPO prospectus, higher underwriter
reputation, higher investor demand for the shares issued at the IPO, lower valuation un-
certainty, higher insider ownership retention, a lower NASDAQ market level, and a higher
o®er-to-book ratio compared to non-survivors. Comparing survivors versus acquired ¯rms,
they ¯nd that acquired ¯rms are smaller in size and have a longer operating history.
Our study focuses on the relevance of patents for the success of dot-com companies.
In particular, we examine the extent to which these ¯rms took advantage of the changing
legal landscape with regard to the patentability of business methods, and the impact of these
decisions on competitive outcomes. Our study therefore combines data on ¯rm characteristics
like age, ¯nancial condition, and market environment with detailed information on their
patent holdings. The patent portfolios of ¯rms in our sample are characterized not just by
counting the number of patents held, but also by measures of patent quality based on citations
and international ¯ling patterns.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Data
To address these questions, we gathered data on 356 ¯rms that made an Initial Public Of-
fering of shares on the NASDAQ stock exchange between February 1998 and August 2001.
These ¯rms were characterized by IPO.com, a then popular but now defunct ¯nancial re-
search service, as operating in the Internet Services, Internet Software and Computer Soft-
ware Segments. We were able to obtain comprehensive data on these ¯rms including listing
information, ¯nancial information, ¯rm age and a variety of measures with regard to their
patent holdings. The data were obtained from di®erent sources including the Delphion,
USPTO, Compustat, CRSP and Venture-Xpert databases as well as ¯rms' 10K ¯lings and
IPO prospectuses. In this subsection we brie°y comment on the variables contained in our
dataset before presenting descriptive statistics in the subsequent subsection.
Listing Information. For each ¯rm we obtained detailed information on its listing on the
NASDAQ stock exchange from the Center for Research on Security Prices CRSP-database.
This data contains not only the date of the IPO (ipodatei) for each ¯rm i but also informa-
tion whether or not a ¯rm is still listed on the NASDAQ. If trading in a ¯rm's stock was
discontinued, we are able to distinguish between ¯rms which were delisted due to business
failure10 and ¯rms which merged with other companies. In both cases, we compute the total
10This category comprises ¯rms which were delisted due to bankruptcy and ¯rms which
have been delisted for trading persistently below the minimum price of $1 per share required
7Table 1: Breakdown of ¯rms by segment. Table includes selected examples of ¯rms in
each segment.
Segment Firms Examples
Internet Services 210 1-800-Flowers.com, 24/7 Real Media, Autobytel.com,
Buy.com, Drugstore.com, eBay, E-loan, Freemarkets,
Genuity, MP3.com, Priceline.com, Razor¯sh, Vertical-
net
Internet Software 82 Critical Path, Entrust, Portal Software, WebMethods
Computer Software 64 Inktomi, Manhattan Associates, Onyx Software, Perot
Systems, Quest Software, Red Hat
Total 356
length of the listing period on the NASDAQ as the time between the date of delisting and
the date of the IPO. This \length of listing period" is used as the duration measure in the
survival analyses.
Industrial Classi¯cation. Based on the classi¯cation used by IPO.com we distinguish be-
tween three di®erent industrial segments: Internet Services, Internet Software and Computer
Software. Dummy variables for these industry segments are included in the multivariate sur-
vival analyses, with ¯rms assigned to Computer Software used as the reference group. These
categories are far from precise, assignment of ¯rms to segments may be questionable, and
some ¯rms may in fact be operating in more than one industry segment. Table 1 shows the
breakdown of ¯rms by segment, and lists some high pro¯le examples of ¯rms operating in
each segment.
Financial Data. We obtained ¯nancial data on a quarterly basis from the Compustat
North America database. Compustat provides information on operating income and sales for
each ¯rm i in quarter t. The cash \burn rate" is often identi¯ed as a critical indicator of the
¯nancial health of startup ¯rms. Unfortunately we do not directly observe cash outlays by the
¯rms in our sample, nor do we have access to information about unused bank credit lines or
other sources of liquidity. However we are able to construct a measure of the ¯nancial status
or liquidity, cashburnit, that captures some aspects of these ¯rms' ¯nancial status. cashburnit
is calculated as the negative of the ratio of operating income for the current quarter to the
sum of cash and short term investments in the previous quarter. This variable measures the
rate at which the ¯rm is accumulating or depleting ¯nancial reserves, with positive values
indicating consumption of the existing stock of cash and shortterm investments and negative
values indicating further accumulation of liquid assets. op incomeit, salesit and cashburnit
are treated as time-varying coe±cients in the multivariate survival analysis of Section 4.11
by NASDAQ regulations.
11In rare cases, these variables are not available for occasional single quarters. We interpo-
late missing values by averaging the preceding and subsequent quarters' value.
8IPO Characteristics. Our dataset contains information on a ¯rm's age when going
public (age ipoi). It is measured as the di®erence between its ipodatei and the date of legal
incorporation which was obtained from the Venture-Xpert database. If the date of incorpora-
tion was not available from Venture-Xpert it was obtained from publicly available documents
such as 10K reports and IPO prospectuses ¯led with the SEC. Information in the Venture-
Xpert and SDC New Issues databases we used to determine whether or not each ¯rm was
venture capital backed before its IPO. Further, we obtained ¯rms' total assets reported in the
quarter when going public (assets tot ipoi) from the Compustat North America-database and
include this variable as a measure of a ¯rm's capital endowment "at birth" in our multivariate
analysis. Since we are able to identify the levels of Cash & Short Term Investments as well
as Property, Plant and Equipment reported in a ¯rm's balance sheet, we further include the
shares of these position when going public (as a fraction of total assets) in the regressions.
Market Environment. Capital markets in general, and the market for technology re-
lated IPOs in particular, were characterized by quite extraordinary \bubble" conditions
throughout the period of this study. Investor \exuberance" during this period is widely
believe to have created market conditions in which large amounts of capital could be raised
at remarkably low prices, and with relatively little scrutiny. In order to control for these
conditions, we include the average value of the NASDAQ Composite Index in the quarter
prior to quarter in which a ¯rm's IPO took place (nasdaq ipo lagi) as a control variable in
our regressions.
Patent Information. Various variables that describe a ¯rm's patent portfolio such as
number of patents, international scope of ¯lings, and proxies for patent value were collected
from USPTO and other data maintained by Delphion Inc. For each ¯rm in the dataset, Del-
phion's databases on issued patents and published applications were searched by hand using
the company name, along with word stems, common abbreviations, and obvious variations
in spelling of companies' names. \Weak" matches were veri¯ed by inspecting the inventor
names, address information, citations to other patents, and the content of abstracts. In
principle, this procedure captured all patent applications and issued patents for which the
¯rm in question was the assignee. Nonetheless is likely that some patents controlled by the
¯rms in this sample were not captured in this search. The search process relies heavily on
USPTO's coding of assignee names, and does not capture patents re-assigned to a ¯rm after
issuance, exclusively licensed from the inventor, or held in subsidiaries that we were not able
to recognize. It is also possible that a signi¯cant number of pending applications have been
missed in the search, either because the applicant chose to forfeit ¯ling rights outside the US,
thus avoiding publication of the application entirely, or because the 18-month period before
publication was still in force at the time the search was performed.
Interestingly, notwithstanding many contemporary commentators' beliefs that business
method and software patents were trivially easy to obtain during this period, no issued
9patents or applications could be found for more than half of the ¯rms in this sample. Dummy
variables were coded to indicate whether ¯rms in a particular segment did apply for or hold
any patents.
Various measures of the size and characteristics of each ¯rms' patent portfolio were com-
puted. These include the number of USPTO patent applications and grants, as well as counts
of applications and grants at the European and Japanese Patent O±ces, plus variables which
are correlates to patent value: the average family size of a ¯rm's USPTO patents, the average
number of forward citations received per grant or application, and the number of forward
citations per claim.12
It is well-known that the value distribution of patents is highly skewed (Harho® et al.
1999, 2003) and value measures that average the number of cites per claim over the entire
portfolio of patents held by a ¯rm largely obscures this phenomenon. We therefore attempt
to capture some aspects of the skewness of the value distribution by counting the the number
of patents in a ¯rm's patent portfolio which received 7 or more forward citations (which is
approximately the upper quartile of the distribution of number of forward citations in this
sample.)
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Before advancing to our multivariate analysis of ¯rm survival in Section 4 we brie°y present
major descriptive statistics of the sample. In total, our sample contains 356 ¯rms that
went public between February, 25th, 1998 and August, 6th, 2001. These 356 ¯rms make up
about 74% of the total number of IPOs reported by IPO.com in the three industry segments
considered. (The remainder are ¯rms for which reliable matches to the databases on NASDAQ
trading, venture funding, or ¯nancial information could not be made.) The distribution of
the IPO dates of these ¯rms (Figure 1) shows that most of them went public in the years
1999 and 2000. Strikingly, this distribution tracks the movement of the NASDAQ composite
index during this period (see Figure 2).
In total, NASDAQ trading in more than 60% of the ¯rms in our sample had been discon-
tinued by March 1st 2005, the end of the observational period. Table 2 clearly shows that
¯rms from the Internet Services segment exhibit the highest exit rates with 69.5% leaving
the sample before August 2005, compared to 59.7% for Internet Software and only 46.9% for
Computer software ¯rms. The average time elapsed until trading was discontinued is also
presented in Table 2. Note that the average time until ¯rms exited as a result of merger
is signi¯cantly shorter than the time until delisting due to business failure. Moreover, this
di®erence is much more pronounced for ¯rms from the Computer Software segment compared
to ¯rms with a business model related to the internet. 13
12Lanjouw & Schankerman (2001) argue that this measure is superior to simple counts of
forward citations. Note that this measure is computed using only granted patents since the
number of claims is not reported for patent applications.
13Table 11 tracks the ¯nancial status of exiting ¯rms for the ¯ve quarters preceeding exit.
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Table 2: Crosstabulation of industrial classi¯cation and the listing information for
the ¯rms contained in our sample. The second line of each row contains the average
listing duration. Note: In a Pearson Â2-test the di®erences between ¯rms of di®erent
industrial classi¯cations turned out to be signi¯cant at the 5% level (Â2(4) = 11:57).
Listing Information
Classi¯cation Still trading Merged Delisted Total
Internet Services 64 (30.48%) 87 (41.42%) 59 (28.10%) 210
. 2.0 Yrs 2.3 Yrs
Internet Software 33 (40.24%) 31 (37.81%) 18 (29.95%) 82
. 2.1 Yrs 2.4 Yrs
Computer Software 34 (53.13%) 18 (28.12%) 12 (18.75%) 64
. 2.2 Yrs 3.1 Yrs
Total 131 (36.8%) 136 (38.2%) 89 (25.0%) 356
. 2.1 Yrs 2.4 Yrs
11Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Curves for the ¯rms in the sample. (|) Internet
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Kaplan−Meier Survivor Curves
Moving beyond the information in average survival times, Figure 3 presents Kaplan-Meier
product-limit estimates of the survivor functions of the ¯rms in our sample i (Kaplan & Meier
1958). The survivor curves again show that ¯rms with internet-based business models drop
out much earlier than Computer Software ¯rms. Moreover, once past the one year mark,
the survival curves for the three groups do not intersect, indicating that the proportionality
assumption of Cox's Proportional Hazard model is likely to hold with regard to the di®erent
classi¯cations of our ¯rms (Kalb°eisch & Prentice 2002).
Table 3 summarizes some of the important observable characteristics of the ¯rms at the
time of their IPO. First, consider the age of the ¯rm. (Recall that age is measured as time
elapsed from the date of incorporation until the date of the IPO.) While the average ¯rm is
5.91 years old when the IPO takes place, ¯rms from the Internet Services segment have a prior
¯rm history of only 4.72 years, while ¯rms from the other industry segments are signi¯cantly
older: ¯rms in the Internet Software segment averaged 6.78 years since incorporation, and
those in Computer Software averaged 8.69 years. There are also di®erences across segments
in the extent to which the IPOs of these ¯rms were backed by venture capital ¯rms. In
particular, IPOs in the Internet Software segment were more frequently venture-backed (64%)
than Internet Services ¯rms (55%) or Computer Software ¯rms (56%). Di®erences across
industry segments are also apparent in the sales and operating pro¯ts reported by the ¯rms
for the quarter in which their IPO took place. On average, ¯rms in the Computer Software
segment realized the highest sales (US$17.45 million) and made only minor operating losses of
US$0.5. Internet Services ¯rms achieved somewhat lower sales, averaging US$12.95 million,
and Internet Software ¯rms averaged even less, at US$7.55 million in their ¯rst quarter as
Acquired or merging ¯rms had relatively stable sales, improving operating income, and a
moderate decline in cash and short term investments. By contrast, delisted ¯rms had falling
sales, sign¯cantly higher losses, and a rapidly deteriorating cash position.
12Table 3: Mean values of major ¯rm characteristics for the quarter when their IPO took
place.
Firm Internet Internet Computer
Characteristics Services Software Software Total
(n=210) (n=82) (n=64) (n=356)
Age (Years) 4.72 6.78 8.69 5.91
Venture-backed 0.55 0.64 0.56 0.58
Sales ($MM) 12.95 7.55 17.45 12.51
Operating Income ($MM) -9.50 -5.56 -0.49 -6.97
Proceeds from IPO ($MM) 149.49 150.58 112.33 143.06
Assets ($MM) 164.09 84.49 84.89 131.52
Property, Plant and Equipment
($MM)
22.84 4.27 6.49 15.82
Cash and Short-term Investment
($MM)
88.88 64.62 51.19 76.62
Cash burn rate 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.41
a public company. Moreover, when going public these internet-related ¯rms were highly
unpro¯table with operating losses averaging US$9.5 million per quarter in Internet Services
and US$5.6 million per quarter in Internet software (see Table 3). These di®erences in
pro¯tability are also re°ected by our cashburn measure of liquidity, de¯ned as the negative
of the ratio of operating pro¯ts divided by cash and shortterm investments in the previous
period. In the quarter of their IPO, ¯rms from the Internet Services segment had on average
operating losses equalling about 45% of their cash and shortterm investments while this
measure is only about 26% for Internet Software ¯rms Computer Software ¯rms had on
average operating losses of 44% of their cash on short term investments (see Table 3).
Turning to information on the patenting activities of the ¯rms in the sample, Table 4
reports the distribution of patent applications across technology classes, using the US Patent
Classi¯cation scheme, and classifying patents based on the primary USPC code. Not surpris-
ingly, classes that are relevant to the e-commerce and the internet (networking, databases,
cryptography etc.) are well represented. Interestingly Class 705 (in which most business
method patents should be classi¯ed) accounts for only 11.4% of the 1198 applications in our
dataset.14
As noted above, a substantial fraction (53.8%) of the ¯rms in our sample did not patent
at all prior to March 2005, with signi¯cant di®erences across industry segments: 65.2% of the
Internet Services, 51.2% of the Internet Software ¯rms and 45.3% of the Computer Software
¯rms had not ¯led a published patent application at the USPTO, the EPO, or the JPO. 15
Table 5 gives summary statistics of the patenting activities of ¯rms that did ¯le at least
14These patents are held by 14 ¯rms classi¯ed to Internet Services, two ¯rms from Internet
Software and only one ¯rm from Computer Software.
15Though there were (and are) signi¯cant di®erences in principle across USPTO, EPO,
and JPO as regards patentability of software and business methods, this has not in practice
prevented ¯rms from obtaining patents on these types of inventions in all of these jurisdictions.
13Table 4: Classi¯cation of the USPTO patent applications of the ¯rms in the sample.
Class Description Patents Share
709 Electrical computers and digital processing systems: multi-
computer data transferring
188 15.69%
705 Data processing: ¯nancial, business practice, management,
or cost/ price determination
137 11.44%
345 Computer graphics processing and selective visual display
systems
134 11.19%
707 Data processing: database and ¯le management or data
structures
122 10.18%
713 Electrical computers and digital processing systems: support 111 9.27%
704 Data processing: speech signal processing, linguistics, lan-
guage translation, and audio compression
42 3.51%
380 Cryptography 38 3.18%
370 Multiplex communications 37 3.09%
434 Education and demonstration 37 3.09%
375 Pulse or digital communications 35 2.92%
379 Telephonic communications 33 2.75%
725 Interactive video distribution systems 26 2.17%
. Other classes with less than 20 applications (2% of total) 258 21.54%
Total 1198 100%
14one published patent application. Firms from the Computer Software segment are most
active patentees, averaging 12.29 USPTO applications per patenting ¯rm, compared to 9.62
for Internet Software patenting ¯rms, and only 4.92 USPTO applications for patenting ¯rms
in Internet Services.16 Table 5 also reports the extent of international patenting activity by
the sample ¯rms. On average, EPO and JPO applications and grants are signi¯cantly lower
than at USPTO, with smaller di®erences across industry segments. Curiously, despite being
the least active patentees in terms of the average size of their patent portfolio, the share of
international patentees is highest in the group of Internet Services ¯rms, with the opposite
e®ect visible for Computer Software ¯rms.
In addition to the patent counts, Table 5 also reports measures of the value or quality
of these ¯rms' patent portfolios. The average number of claims for the patents held by the
¯rms in our sample is 23.43 with small di®erences across groups. The average patent family
size is 5.24. However measures which are correlates to patent value are of highest interest.
Interestingly, we observe signi¯cant di®erences in the average number of forward citations
per patent, which are highest for Computer Software ¯rms with 7.32 compared to 5.14 for
Internet Services and 4.60 for Internet Software ¯rms. Similarly, the average proportion of
¯rms' portfolios that is made up of highly cited patents (7 or more citations received) is
highest in Computer Software, as is the average across portfolios of the number of citations
received per claim. While it is tempting to interpret these as evidence of higher average
quality or value of patents in the Computer Software segment compared to Internet Services
or Internet Software, it is important to recognize that some of this variation may simply
re°ect di®erences across segments in the nature of technology or citation practices, and most
importantly, in the size of the population of potentially citing patents.17
Finally, Table 6 summarizes our dependent variable in the multivariate analysis of Section
4 (the time between the IPO and the delisting of a ¯rm) within di®erent categorizations of
important independent variables at the IPO date. Comparing the average duration for ¯rms
which ¯led at least one patent (opposed to ¯rms which did not apply for a patent in the
US) we ¯nd that patenting is associated with longer survival times. The same is true when
distinguishing ¯rms which obtained venture capital funding prior to their IPO with ¯rms
which did not. Having obtained venture capital ¯nancing is also positively related to the
duration of the listing period on the NASDAQ. Finally, we report ¯nancial characteristics
like operating income and total assets when going public. We categorize these variables in the
quartiles of their respective distribution and ¯nd that both in°uence survival chances. The
relation between operating income and survival time is straightforward: Firms generating
16It is possible that these di®erences are a consequence of di®erences in ¯rm age. However,
the correlation coe±cient between the number of USPTO patent applications and the ¯rm
age when going public is 0.06 and not signi¯cant.
17Interestingly, though, these di®erences do not appear to be driven by the age of ¯rms and
the age of their patents. Since older patents can be cited for a longer period of time than
younger patents, they ought on average to receive more citations. However, the correlation
coe±cient between the number of citations received and ¯rm age when going public is 0.03
and not signi¯cant.
15Table 5: Mean values of major patent characteristics of ¯rms who applied for at least
one published patent application at the USPTO, EPO, or JPO. Firms without any
patenting activities are excluded from the computation of average values. (+ indicates
that statistics are computed only for issued USPTO patents since the number of claims
is not reported for published applications.)
Patent Internet Internet Computer
Characteristics Services Software Software Total
(n=74) (n=42) (n=35) (n=151)
Share of ¯rms with 0 applications 0.65 0.51 0.45 0.58
USPTO applications 4.92 9.62 12.29 7.93
USPTO grants 4.28 9.14 10.91 7.17
EPO applications 2.86 3.00 2.94 2.92
EPO grants 1.79 2.19 1.23 1.79
JPO applications 0.28 0.60 0.31 0.38
JPO grants 0.23 0.30 0.23 0.25
Share of international patentees 0.64 0.57 0.54 0.60
Family size at USPTO 4.89 5.36 5.86 5.24
USPTO claims+ 22.42 23.91 25.00 23.43
Cites per patent 4.60 5.14 7.32 5.39
Share of patents with ¸ 7 cites 0.21 0.27 0.35 0.26
Cites per claim+ 0.50 0.56 0.64 0.55
income in the top quartiles tend to exhibit longer survival times than ¯rms from lower quar-
tiles. The relation between assets reported when going public and survival is more complex.
On average, we observe a U-shaped relation with ¯rms belonging to the top and the lowest
quartiles having longer survival times than ¯rms from the middle quartiles. However, ¯rms
which delisted their shares due to bankruptcy exhibit longer survival times if their reported
assets lie in the 2nd quartile. In order to disentangle the e®ects of the di®erent independent
variables we conduct a multivariate survival analysis based on the Cox Proportional Hazards
model in the following Section.
16Table 6: Mean time until delisting. Table entries are the mean time (in years) until
delisting broken down by di®erent characteristics of ¯rms. Categories are de¯ned by
the values of independent variables as of the IPO date. Note that the table is based
only on the 225 ¯rms which were delisted from the NASDAQ within the sample period.
Variable Merged Firms Delisted Firms Total
Duration Obs Duration Obs Duration Obs
Patents
At least one patent applica-
tion
2.14 48 2.59 33 2.32 81
No patent application 2.01 88 2.32 56 2.13 144
Venture Capital
VC funding obtained 2.25 46 2.54 40 2.39 86
No VC funding obtained 1.95 90 2.32 49 2.08 139
Operating Income
1st Quartile 1.74 40 2.11 29 1.89 69
2nd Quartile 1.94 36 2.31 25 2.09 61
3rd Quartile 2.27 27 2.77 28 2.52 55
4th Quartile 2.37 33 2.67 7 2.43 40
Total Assets at IPO
1st Quartile 2.25 36 2.44 24 2.33 60
2nd Quartile 1.92 36 2.56 23 2.17 59
3rd Quartile 1.91 38 2.33 17 2.04 55
4th Quartile 2.17 26 2.33 25 2.25 51
Cash and Short-Term In-
vestments at IPO
1st Quartile 2.02 25 2.56 21 2.26 46
2nd Quartile 2.05 33 2.41 26 2.21 59
3rd Quartile 2.05 59 2.39 22 2.14 81
4th Quartile 2.10 19 2.32 20 2.21 39
174 Multivariate Survival Analysis
We now proceed to analyze the in°uence of various ¯rm characteristics, speci¯cally ¯nancial
data and patent holdings, on ¯rm survival.
4.1 Methodology
In order to analyze the determinants of ¯rm survival we employ a simple hazard model where
we consider survival time as a nonnegative random variable T.18 A basic concept for the
analysis of survival times is the hazard function ¸(t), which is de¯ned as the limit
¸(t) = lim
¢t!0
P(t · T < t + ¢t j T ¸ t)
¢t
and measures the instantaneous failure rate at time t given that the individual survives
until t. In the following, di®erent survival models are estimated where the hazard function
depends on a set of covariates x0 = (x1;:::;xp) that in°uence the survival time T.
The reference model for multivariate survival analysis is Cox's proportional hazard (PH)
model (Cox 1972) where the hazard rate is assumed to be the product
¸(t;x) = ¸0(t)exp(x1¯1 + ::: + xp¯p) = ¸0(t)exp(x0¯):
In this model the baseline hazard rate ¸0(t) remains unspeci¯ed and, through the ex-
ponential link function, the covariates x act multiplicatively on the hazard rate. We use
a speci¯cation which includes both time-variant regressors xit like the quarterly operating
income or sales and also time-invariant regressors like ¯rm characteristics at the IPO and the
patent characteristics xj. Hence, the speci¯cation we have to estimate is of the form
¸(t;x) = ¸0(t)exp(xj¯j + xit¯i):
As noted above, we are able to observe di®erent modes of exit from the sample: ¯rms
can either be delisted as a result of bankruptcy or minimal market value, or cease trading
as a result of a merger or takeover. We therefore report estimation results from both a
pooled model that does not distinguish between di®erent outcomes, as well as a competing
risks model that explicitly takes into account the di®erent modes of exit.19 Schary (1991)
emphasizes important economic di®erences between di®erent forms of exit and argues for a
18Recall that the survival time is the de¯ned as the time between the ¯rst listing of a ¯rm
and the discontinuation of share-trading at the NASDAQ.
19Results from alternative parametric estimations are similar to the results from our Cox
PH models. Results from log-logistic speci¯cations of the competing risks survival models
are not reported but can be obtained from the authors upon request.
18separation of exit types when studying ¯rm survival.
4.2 Results
The results of our multivariate estimations are reported in Tables 8 through 10 at the end of
the paper. Table 7 gives descriptive statistics for the regressors.
In Table 8 results are reported for pooled and competing risks models for two di®erent
sets of explanatory variables. The ¯rst speci¯cation (left part of Table 8) contains only ¯rm-
speci¯c characteristics, the level of the NASDAQ composite index in the quarter preceding
the IPO, and the dummy variables indicating whether a ¯rms from the di®erent segments
have ¯led at least one patent application or not. In the second speci¯cation (right part of
Table 8) we control for characteristics of ¯rms' patent portfolios using the variables described
above.
Column (1) of Table 8 contains the estimation results from the pooled model, which
does not distinguish between di®erent exit modes. Large and strongly signi¯cant e®ects are
estimated for sales, total assets, cash burn rate, the level of the NASDAQ composite index
and the no-patent dummies. Unsurprisingly, ¯rms with higher sales exhibit higher survival
probabilities. An additional $10MM per quarter in sales (sample average of $21.96MM)
increases the probability of survival by about 2%. Moreover, we ¯nd that our cash burn
rate measure is a strongly signi¯cant determinant of ¯rm survival with high cash burn rates
associated with a substantially increased hazard rate. Curiously, the small but strongly
signi¯cant e®ect of total assets at the time of IPO indicates that ¯rms that were able to raise
larger amounts of capital were somewhat more likely to exit.
Older ¯rms have a lower risk of failure, with an additional year of pre-IPO existence
increasing the probability of survival by about 3%, though the estimated coe±cient is not
signi¯cant. The results for level of the NASDAQ composite index are also interesting, and
con¯rm previous ¯ndings. Firms that went public during periods of higher market valua-
tions for high-tech ¯rms have markedly lower survival chances. The estimated coe±cient
implies that an additional 1000 points on the NASDAQ at the time of IPO would reduce the
probability of survival by almost 30%. Not having applied for any patents is also a strong
determinant of failure. Firms that ¯led at least one patent application have a 34% lower
probability of exit relative to baseline.
Controls for industry segment show very large (and for Internet Services ¯rms, highly
signi¯cant) di®erences in the hazard rates. Firms in Internet Services are twice as likely to
exit via a merger as ¯rms in Computer Software. However, we ¯nd no signi¯cant e®ect for
¯rms in Internet Software compared to the reference group.
The results from our pooled model conceal some interesting di®erences across modes of
exit from the sample. Results from the competing risks model which distinguishes between
delistings due to acquisition or merger of the ¯rm and delistings due to business failure
19(Columns (2) and (3) of Table 8) are revealing.20
While the e®ect of the operating pro¯ts was | somewhat surprisingly | not statistically
signi¯cant in the pooled risks speci¯cation, the competing risks speci¯cation clearly shows
that this result is due to two o®setting e®ects. The estimated e®ect of operating pro¯ts is
positive and signi¯cant for ¯rms that have merged or been acquired since their IPO, but
negative and signi¯cant for ¯rms whose shares have been delisted due to business failure.
Moreover, we also observe di®erent e®ects for the dummy variable indicating whether ¯rms
were venture capital backed prior to their IPO. While venture-backed ¯rms are much more
likely to exit via merger/acquisition (Column 2), they exhibit lower (albeit insigni¯cantly
di®erent from baseline) hazard rates with regard to a delisting due to business failure (Column
3). Firms that were older at the time of their IPO have a marginally signi¯cantly lower
hazard rate for being delisted due to business failure, with no e®ect on the hazard of exiting
via merger/acquisition. Turning to the e®ect of the total assets and the share of tangible
assets of the total assets reported by a ¯rm at the time of IPO, very substantial di®erences
are apparent in the hazards for di®erent modes of exit. No statistically signi¯cant e®ect
is found on the hazard of exit via merger/acquisition, however a signi¯cant e®ect of small
magnitude is found for the hazard of delisting due to business failure. Similarly, the cash burn
rate variable has markedly di®erent e®ects for di®erent modes of exit: there is no signi¯cant
impact on the hazard for exit via merger/acquisition, but a very strong e®ect on the hazard
for exit via delisting. Puzzlingly, the e®ect of total assets is positive: having another $100MM
at the time of IPO (compared to the sample average of $126MM raises the likelihood of exit
through business failure by 0.1%). However, ¯rms reporting higher shares of tangibles assets
compared to the total amount of assets reported at the IPO have a signi¯cantly lower risk of
failure due to bankruptcy.
The e®ects described above remain largely unchanged once the variables characterizing
the patent portfolios held by these ¯rms are introduced (see right part of Table 8). In the
pooled risks model (Column 4) estimated hazard ratios on most of the ¯rm characteristics
are very similar in magnitude. Firms which were younger, were not venture-backed, were less
pro¯table, had higher assets, and IPO'd when the NASDAQ was at a higher level were less
likely to survive. Very similar di®erences between ¯rms that exited as a result of business
failure and ¯rms that were merged/acquired are also apparent. Introducing the patent port-
folio characteristics has only a small e®ect on the \no patents" coe±cients, which become
somewhat smaller in magnitude.
Among the patent portfolio variables, only the total number of patent applications ¯led
at the USPTO is a signi¯cant determinant of ¯rm survival. Applying for one more patent
lowers the probability of exit by almost 5% in the pooled risks model. A marked di®erence
in this e®ect is seen in the competing risks model: ¯rms with more patent applications had
20A formal test of whether exits to di®erent states are behaviorally distinct is presented
in the Appendix. The null hypothesis of proportionality of cause-speci¯c hazards is strongly
rejected Â2(11) = 327:26 for the models in columns (1) through (3), and Â2(16) = 344:07 for
the models in columns (4) through (6).
20a 10% lower hazard of exiting via merger/acquisition, but no signi¯cant e®ect is seen on the
hazard of exiting via delisting.21
Disappointingly in the light of evidence on correlation between patent quality measures
and patent value in other contexts, no signi¯cant e®ects for the variables describing char-
acteristics of the patent portfolios beyond the number of applications were found in the
pooled risks model. The same is true for the competing risks model (Columns 5 and 6 of
Table 8) with one interesting exception. Having a portfolio with a higher fraction of highly
cited patents had a positive and marginally signi¯cant e®ect on the probability of exiting via
merger/acquisition. We (cautiously) interpret this as evidence that highly cited patents are
a particularly valuable asset, or a signal that the exiting ¯rm's technology/business model
is high quality. (Though the inverse e®ect is found on the hazard of being delisted due to
business failure, this e®ect was not signi¯cant.)
Turning to the issue of Business Method Patents (de¯ned as patents ¯led in USPTO
Class 705), Tables 9 and 10 present results from re-estimating the models of Table 8 columns
(4) to (6) with a distinction drawn between \705" patents and \non-705" patents. Patents
held or applied for by the ¯rms in the sample were divided into two groups, those with
USPC class 705 (\Data Processing: ¯nancial, business practice, management, or cost/price
determination") appearing anywhere in the list of patent classes, and those where 705 ap-
peared nowhere.22 Panel I of Table 9 repeats the estimation, but with the patent portfolio
characteristics computed only from the non-705 patents; in Panel II the patent variables are
constructed only from the Class 705 patents.
The estimated hazard ratios in Panel I are almost identical to those obtained in Table 8.
The new \no patents" dummy has statistically signi¯cant coe±cients re°ecting the ¯ndings
from Table 8. In Panel II, where the non-705 patents have been removed from consideration,
the \no patents" dummy loses signi¯cance, and the estimated e®ect of number of patent
applications falls essentially to zero. We conclude, therefore, that the Class 705 patents seem
to have very little e®ect on the survival of ¯rms, with the possible exception of patents with
a high number of citations received per claim. The coe±cient on this variable implies a
a large, positive, and strongly signi¯cant estimated e®ect on the probability of exiting via
merger/acquisition: raising citations per claim by one unit (compared to a sample average of
0.23) increases the hazard of exit via merger by almost 80%. Note that there is no signi¯cant
e®ect of this variable on the hazard of exiting via delisting.
Table 10 evaluates di®erences between Class 705 and non-705 patents somewhat di®er-
ently. Here the speci¯cation of the model is expanded to include two sets of patent portfolio
21In their analysis of 429 Finnish M&A-transactions, Hyytinen et al. (2005) ¯nd that the
probability of being acquired by a domestic ¯rm decreases with the number of European
patents held by the target. However, the probability of an acquisition by a foreign ¯rm
increases with the number of patents.
22This is slightly more expansive de¯nition of a Business Method Patent, capturing an
additional 55 patents beyond the 137 that have 705 as their primary USPC class. It does
not, however, capture any patents that have been carefully worded to avoid the extra scrutiny
applied by the USPTO to business methods applications since 2000.
21characteristics: those computed from the applications in the Class 705 category, and those
computed from the applications outside class 705. Again, separating out the Class 705 patents
has little e®ect on the results. Estimated hazard ratios on all the ¯rm characteristics are very
similar to those obtained previously, and as in Table 9, the only strongly signi¯cant impact
of Class 705 patents is the large positive coe±cient on citations per claim in the competing
risks model.
5 Conclusion
Many new enterprises were created in the 1990s based on innovation in internet-enabled
business models and supporting software technologies. Some of these ¯rms took advantage of
the option opened up by changing legal doctrine to protect their competitive position by ¯ling
patent applications on their inventions. The 356 newly-listed ¯rms studied here collectively
¯led at least 1198 US patent applications, however these applications were generated by
only 42% of the ¯rms in the sample. Our results suggest that the ¯rms that were unable or
unwilling to seek patent protection were much less likely to survive the collapse of the dot.com
bubble after 2001. After controlling for age of the enterprise, sales, assets, pro¯tability and
liquidity, as well as stock market valuations and venture capital backing prior to their IPO, we
¯nd that ¯rms with no patent applications had a much higher hazard of exiting the sample.
This is true both for the ¯rms that exited as a result of being delisted from the NASDAQ
due to apparent business failure, and for those that exited as a consequence of a merger or
acquisition (which presumably re°ects higher value of the ¯rm's assets in a di®erent corporate
context.)
Of course, these estimated e®ects may not just represent the value of patents as a compet-
itive asset in these markets. The estimated positive association between patenting and ¯rm
survival may also re°ect a correlation between patenting and the underlying quality of the
¯rm's products, business model, management, and other intangible assets. But it suggests
a signi¯cant role for patents in driving industry dynamics in these technologies, especially
within Internet Software. Puzzlingly, though applying for additional patents is associated
with lower probability of exit, conventional measures of the quality or value of the patents
held by a ¯rm have little explanatory power in our regressions, though we ¯nd a hint that
that highly cited patents may be an attractive asset for acquirers.
Interestingly for the debate about business method patents, we ¯nd that they have very
little impact on survival compared to patents classi¯ed in other classes. There is one intriguing
exception to this general result: ¯rms which hold business method patents that attract more
forward citations per claim appear to be more attractive targets for merger or acquisition.
Our estimates also point to some serious problems with adverse selection and the func-
tioning of the US capital markets in the late 1990s. Firms that raised greater amounts of
money before and during their IPO were signi¯cantly more likely to exit, particularly through
delisting due to business failure. We also ¯nd a very large and signi¯cant e®ect of prevail-
22ing stock market valuations preceding the IPO: ¯rms that went public at the height of the
dot-com bubble faced much higher probabilities of being subsequently delisted.
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27A Test of Proportionality of Competing Risk Spec-
i¯cation
Narendranathan & Stewart (1991) provide a test of whether exits to di®erent states are
behaviorally distinct (rather than simply incidental) for continuous time proportional hazards
models. This is a test of the hypothesis that the cause-speci¯c hazards are all proportional
to one another (i.e. that all parameters except the intercepts are equal across the hazards).
The test statistic TS proposed by Narendranathan & Stewart (1991) is given by




where ln(LRC) is the maximised log-likelihood from the competing risk model (the sum
of those from the component risk models), ln(LSR) is the maximised log-likelihood from the
single-risk model, nj is the number of exits to state j and pj = nj=
P
j nj, where there are
j = 1;:::;J destination states. The test-statistic is distributed Chi-squared with degrees of
freedom equal to the number of restrictions.
For our basic models reported in Table 8, we can reject the null hypothesis of risk pro-
portionality at 1% of signi¯cance both for the models not including patent characteristics
(TS = 327:27) as well as for the model containing patent characteristics (TS = 344:07).
Hence, we reject the hypothesis that the di®erent forms of exit are behaviorally equal.
For our models containing only the set of no-705-patents and the set of 705-patent (as
reported in Table 9), we can reject the null hypothesis of risk proportionality at 1% of sig-
ni¯cance for both speci¯cations (TS = 343:01 and TS = 342:07). Hence, we reject that the
di®erent the hypothesis that the di®erent forms of exit are behaviorally equal.
For our models distinguishing between no-705-patents and 705-patent (as reported in
Table 10), we can reject the null hypothesis of risk proportionality at 1% of signi¯cance
(TS = 349:09). Hence, we reject that the di®erent the hypothesis that the di®erent forms of






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 8: Results from Cox Proportional Hazards Regression. Estimates from pooled
and Competing Risks Speci¯cation are presented. Z-Values in parentheses. ** 1%, *
5%, + 10% signi¯cant.
Pooled Competing Risks Pooled Competing Risks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Merged Delisted Merged Delisted
Age at IPO 0.9735 0.9832 0.9388 0.9753 0.9867 0.9344
(1.46) (0.75) (1.89)+ (1.37) (0.60) (1.99)*
Venture backed 1.0890 1.4421 0.7853 1.0866 1.4082 0.8042
(0.60) (1.93)+ (1.07) (0.58) (1.79)+ (0.96)
Operating income 0.9998 1.0132 0.9961 0.9994 1.0127 0.9962
(0.08) (1.60) (2.44)* (0.29) (1.50) (2.39)*
Sales 0.9880 0.9956 0.9563 0.9879 0.9961 0.9563
(3.14)** (1.20) (4.52)** (3.08)** (1.04) (4.46)**
Total assets at IPO 1.0760 0.9306 1.2673 1.0980 0.9577 1.2763
(2.24)* (0.67) (4.52)** (2.73)** (0.41) (4.39)**
Share of PPE in total assets 0.6211 0.1033 3.2547 0.6141 0.1139 3.3543
(0.57) (1.56) (1.14) (0.58) (1.51) (1.14)
Share of cash in total assets 0.9100 1.3620 0.4262 0.9901 1.5076 0.4966
(0.29) (0.69) (1.80)+ (0.03) (0.92) (1.44)
Cash burn rate 1.0620 1.0076 1.0841 1.0587 1.0057 1.0867
(4.86)** (0.20) (5.65)** (4.43)** (0.20) (5.03)**
NASDAQ prior to IPO 1.3292 1.2338 1.3979 1.3474 1.2561 1.4271
(2.56)* (1.50) (1.80)+ (2.65)** (1.62) (1.86)+
At least one patent 0.6364 0.6098 0.6725 0.7331 0.6622 0.8706
application (2.99)** (2.59)** (1.58) (1.37) (1.41) (0.38)
No. of US patent applications 0.9451 0.9016 0.9990
(2.03)* (2.37)* (0.03)
At least one international 1.0460 1.0812 1.0091
patent application (0.19) (0.26) (0.02)
Average cites per claim 0.9919 1.0807 0.7727
(0.07) (0.67) (0.84)
No. of patents with 1.0604 1.1718 0.9231
>6 forward cites (0.84) (1.71)+ (0.64)
Average patent family size 1.0141 1.0249 0.9873
(0.50) (0.80) (0.23)
Internet Services 2.1047 2.2390 2.0358 1.9616 2.1382 1.8213
(3.18)** (2.73)** (1.81)+ (2.82)** (2.52)* (1.48)
Internet Software 1.5783 1.6478 1.5431 1.5591 1.6263 1.5569
(1.79)+ (1.55) (1.02) (1.72)+ (1.50) (1.00)
Observations 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671
Firms 356 356 356 356 356 356
Exits 225 136 89 225 136 89
Log Likelihood -1108.66 -689.47 -394.29 -1104.93 -684.55 -392.59
30Table 9: Results from Cox Proportional Hazards Regression. Estimates from pooled
and Competing Risks Speci¯cations. Note: Patent characteristics used in Panels I and
II are computed from di®erent sets of patents. Z-Values in parentheses ** 1%, * 5%,
+ 10% signi¯cant.
I: No 705 Patents II: Only 705 Patents
Pooled Competing Risks Pooled Competing Risks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Merged Delisted Merged Delisted
Age at IPO 0.9713 0.9804 0.9362 0.9750 0.9836 0.9443
(1.60) (0.88) (1.97)* (1.38) (0.73) (1.76)+
Venture backed 1.1042 1.4486 0.8043 1.0962 1.4574 0.7809
(0.69) (1.95)+ (0.96) (0.64) (1.98)* (1.08)
Operating income 0.9991 1.0111 0.9961 0.9998 1.0138 0.9962
(0.43) (1.30) (2.45)* (0.09) (1.57) (2.43)*
Sales 0.9883 0.9969 0.9554 0.9882 0.9964 0.9550
(3.02)** (0.84) (4.46)** (2.98)** (0.92) (4.56)**
Total assets at IPO 1.1015 0.9396 1.2859 1.0785 0.9246 1.2672
(2.80)** (0.58) (4.54)** (2.22)* (0.73) (4.44)**
Share of PPE in to-
tal assets
0.4589 0.0639 3.2051 0.4839 0.0618 3.4147
(0.97) (1.98)* (1.18) (0.91) (1.99)* (1.25)
Share of cash in to-
tal assets
0.8072 1.1220 0.4487 0.6950 0.9502 0.4132
(0.81) (0.34) (1.94)+ (1.39) (0.15) (2.15)*
Cash burn rate 1.0548 1.0046 1.0793 1.0566 1.0056 1.0782
(4.28)** (0.21) (5.20)** (4.43)** (0.21) (5.30)**
NASDAQ prior to
IPO
1.3402 1.2500 1.4099 1.3271 1.2291 1.3935
(2.59)** (1.57) (1.79)+ (2.51)* (1.45) (1.78)+
At least one patent
application
0.5843 0.4820 0.8212 0.7122 0.4968 1.4868
(2.21)* (2.25)* (0.51) (1.08) (1.62) (0.74)
No. of US patent
applications
0.9439 0.8966 1.0007 1.0163 1.0401 0.9144
(1.84)+ (2.11)* (0.02) (0.24) (0.51) (0.49)
At least one interna-
tional
1.0208 1.0544 0.9376 0.7803 0.7943 0.7578
patent application (0.10) (0.21) (0.19) (1.36) (1.01) (0.89)
Average cites per
claim
0.9833 1.0609 0.6510 1.6112 1.7599 0.2049
(0.11) (0.38) (0.74) (1.81)+ (2.27)* (1.04)
No. of patents with
>6 cites
1.1009 1.2750 0.8657 1.0066 1.0085 1.5860
(0.63) (1.22) (0.55) (0.03) (0.04) (0.81)
Average patent fam-
ily size
0.9931 1.0065 0.9777 0.9519 0.9444 0.9808
(0.24) (0.20) (0.42) (1.38) (1.29) (0.30)
Internet Services 2.0813 2.2795 1.8954 2.3371 2.5743 2.2549
(3.03)** (2.70)** (1.57) (3.60)** (3.18)** (2.02)*
Internet Software 1.6407 1.7264 1.5318 1.5806 1.6637 1.6174
(1.92)+ (1.68)+ (0.98) (1.77)+ (1.56) (1.09)
Observations 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671 3671
Firms 356 356 356 356 356 356
Exits 225 136 89 225 136 89
Log Likelihoood -1102.20 -682.38 -392.05 -1106.88 -686.97 -393.03
31Table 10: Results from Cox Proportional Hazards Regression. Estimates from pooled





Age at IPO 0.9707 0.9792 0.9389
(1.63) (0.92) (1.90)+
Venture backed 1.1123 1.4460 0.7821
(0.74) (1.94)+ (1.06)
Operating income 0.9992 1.0115 0.9962
(0.36) (1.32) (2.43)*
Sales 0.9881 0.9968 0.9544
(3.04)** (0.84) (4.51)**
Total assets at IPO 1.1055 0.9393 1.2819
(2.85)** (0.58) (4.40)**
Share of PPE in total assets 0.4437 0.0651 3.1755
(1.01) (1.96)* (1.16)
Share of cash in total assets 0.7588 1.0679 0.4508
(1.05) (0.19) (1.91)+
Cash burn rate 1.0582 1.0057 1.0808
(4.42)** (0.20) (5.04)**
NASDAQ prior to IPO 1.3531 1.2716 1.4228
(2.66)** (1.68)+ (1.85)+
At least one non-705 patent application 0.8326 0.8564 0.8700
(0.76) (0.49) (0.36)
At least one international application 1.1083 1.1533 1.0032
(0.43) (0.46) (0.01)
No. of non-705 US applications 0.9356 0.8743 1.0076
(2.06)* (2.43)* (0.17)
Average cites per claim (non-705) 0.9727 1.0379 0.6505
(0.18) (0.24) (0.70)
No. of patents with >6 cites (non-705) 1.1448 1.3620 0.8341
(0.90) (1.55) (0.68)
Average patent family size (non-705) 0.9967 1.0080 0.9849
(0.11) (0.23) (0.26)
At least one 705 patent application 0.6066 0.3951 1.3610
(1.39) (1.84)+ (0.51)
No. of US patent applications in 705 1.0218 1.0621 0.8896
(0.33) (0.84) (0.58)
Average cites per claim (705) 1.6428 1.7932 0.1814
(1.93)+ (2.39)* (1.14)
No. of 70 5 patents with >6 cites 0.9803 0.9911 1.6636
(0.10) (0.04) (0.85)
Average family size (705) 0.9802 0.9729 1.0074
(0.51) (0.57) (0.10)
Internet Services 2.0082 2.2134 1.9082
(2.87)** (2.59)** (1.56)
Internet Software 1.5729 1.6710 1.5863
(1.74)+ (1.56) (1.02)
Observations 3671 3671 3671
Firms 356 356 356
Exits 225 136 89
Log Likelihoood -1101.52 -680.43 -391.12 32Table 11: Mean and median values for key ¯nancial variables in the ¯ve quarters prior
to an observed exit.
Quarters until delisting 4 3 2 1 0
Merged
Sales (in $MM) Mean 17.73 19.01 17.47 17.82 18.21
Median 10.43 10.39 9.43 9.70 9.61
Operating Income (in $MM) Mean -5.49 -4.64 -3.69 -4.34 -4.27
Median -3.83 -3.77 -3.23 -3.58 -2.78
Cash & Short Term Investments Mean 71.39 67.73 66.56 64.31 60.62
(in $MM) Median 48.68 43.09 42.80 40.09 38.77
Working Capital (in $MM) Mean 62.75 56.69 58.22 52.40 52.70
Median 45.68 40.06 44.11 36.83 29.16
Quick Ratio Mean 4.90 4.89 5.27 4.26 4.39
Median 3.79 3.53 3.76 3.29 3.20
Delisted
Sales (in $MM) Mean 17.52 17.64 16.53 15.06 14.06
Median 6.92 6.66 6.24 5.44 5.33
Operating Income (in $MM) Mean -13.98 -14.87 -16.81 -10.38 -14.52
Median -8.26 -5.29 -5.39 -5.02 -3.64
Cash & Short Term Investments Mean 75.35 62.05 48.32 39.21 41.07
(in $MM) Median 21.23 14.75 9.60 2.66 2.85
Working Capital (in $MM) Mean 63.44 43.95 32.33 -10.83 -20.67
Median 22.69 19.33 15.30 10.75 8.83
Quick Ratio Mean 4.16 4.49 4.26 5.89 5.88
Median 2.71 2.20 1.56 1.24 1.22
33